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PROTECTING YOUR ENVIRONMENT,
EXACERBATING INJUSTICE:
AVOIDING “MANDATE HAVENS”
DAVID TAKACS†
INTRODUCTION
The story in the “Business Day” section of the New York Times
begins, somewhat breathlessly: “San Diego – In an unmarked greenhouse,
leafy bushes carpet an acre of land here tucked into the suburban sprawl of
Southern California. The seeds of the inedible, drought-resistant plants,
called jatropha, produce a prize: high quality oil that can be refined into
low-carbon jet fuel or diesel fuel.” The SGB company, whose mission is
“Bringing the opportunities of energy crops to reality,”1 uses DNA
sequencing technology to grow hybridized, domesticated strains of
jatropha. SGB “has deals to plant 250,000 acres of jatropha in Brazil,
India, and other countries expected to eventually produce about 70 million
gallons of fuel a year. That has attracted the interest of energy giants,
airlines, and other multinational companies seeking alternatives to fossil
fuels.” Why? “They see jatropha as a hedge against spikes in petroleum
prices and as a way to comply with government mandates that require the
use of low-carbon fuels.”2
Nowhere in 1300+ words does the author discuss where the quarter of
a million acres would come from. What grows on that land now? Who, in
Brazil, or India, or “other countries,” depends on that land for their
livelihoods? How is SGB obtaining rights to that land? Despite claims that
jatropha grows on “wastelands”—poor soils with little water—analyses by
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1. About, SEEDS, GENOMICS, BIOMATERIALS, http://sgbiofuels.com/pages/company/index.php
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
2. Todd Woody, Jet Fuel by the Acre, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2013, at B1.
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the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and others suggest
that the booming (or blooming) market for jatropha is displacing traditional
crops grown for food, or grown on land where forests previously grew,
including high biodiversity value forests in Ghana, Tanzania, and
Mozambique.3 CIFOR suggests that investors speculating on this incipient
boom are buying up swathes of forestland—while undermining
environmental sustainability in the developing world—to help fulfill
environmental quality mandates in the developed world.4
The axioms of the environmental justice (EJ) movement obtain abroad
as well as at home: 1) some people—disproportionately poor,
disproportionately of color—bear a disproportionate cost of the
externalities of industrial overproduction and overconsumption; 2) some
people—disproportionately poor, disproportionately of color—are far less
likely to enjoy the benefits of this overproduction and overconsumption,
including environmental amenities like clean air, clean water, waste buried
out of sight and mind, green space to enjoy, or simply access to nature’s
products and services that make life possible; and 3) democracy in decision
making, where the poorest are full participants and are building capacity to
negotiate for fair shares of burdens and benefits, is crucial to achieve an
environmentally just world.
In other words, EJ requires distributive and procedural justice. While
the EJ movement this Symposium issue celebrates arose in the United
States, its central tenets apply if we are to achieve justice across
international borders.5 Global EJ concerns itself with the transboundary
distribution of environmental burdens and benefits and the resulting
unequal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens.6 This paper
examines what happens when mandates to clean up local environments and
to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the global North result in
environmental injustice in the global South.7 It proposes solutions to
3. See Gao et al., A Global Analysis of Deforestation Due to Biofuel Development 26, 27–28
(Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper 68, 2011). See also Mackinnon Lawrence, Biofuels
Producers
Hunting
Foreign
Fields,
FORBES
(Oct.
23,
2013,
11:31
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch/2013/10/23/biofuels-producers-hunting-foreign-fields.
4. See Gao et al., supra note 3, at 26–28.
5. See Tom E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and International Climate Change Legislation:
A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 130–31 (2012).
6. André Nollkaemper, Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in International Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 253, 259.
7. I use “North” to refer to developed or industrialized nations. Until recently, Northern nations
have been primarily responsible for creating the problems of global climate change through pollution
associated with industrialization. “Southern” nations are those in the process of development; Southern
nations are least responsible for creating global climate change, yet will suffer the most from its
consequences.
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prevent Northern environmental laws from creating unjust climate change
“mandate havens” in poor, distant communities.
While reviews of international justice cite the “philosophical
pandemonium”8 of what “justice” actually means, I would offer the
clarification that what is “just” is what is “deeply equitable.” By “deep
equity,” I refer to laws, policies, and cultural practices that act in synergy to
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and
ecosystems. The equity is “deep” because values take root within each
individual. It is also deep because it asks that we fundamentally
reformulate our community structures and responsibilities, and situate these
values and responsibilities in our legal systems and policy choices. Our
laws and policies would, in turn, support values and actions promoting
even deeper equity.9
If we seek to realize international EJ through laws and policies that
create a deeply equitable world, addressing global climate change is our
most obvious current starting place. Climate change stems from current
and historical overconsumption of global resources leading to planetary
climactic disruptions that will disproportionately harm the poorest
people—who did least to create the problem.10 While historically the U.S.
and other developed nations have been the primary drivers of climate
change, increasingly the developing world is exacerbating the problem, and
it is the wealthiest in those countries, as well, who will benefit at the
expense of the poorest.
Prof. Paul Harris calls for a “moral
cosmopolitanism” that “requires us more carefully and explicitly to
consider the obligations of the world’s affluent people—those who
consume the most (including great quantities of things we do not need) and
generate the most atmospheric pollution per capita—to do much more to
address this problem, regardless of whether they live in affluent or poor
states.”11
These obligations find legal expression in the principle of Common
8. PAUL G. HARRIS, WORLD ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM INTERNATIONAL TO
GLOBAL JUSTICE 32 (2010).
9. David Takacs, Forest Carbon Offsets and International Law: A Deep Equity Legal Analysis,
22 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 526 (2010).
10. UN-REDD PROGRAMME, GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 8–10
(2013), available at http://www.un-redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default .aspx
(follow the link “UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC));
Stephanie Baez, The “Right” REDD Framework: National Laws That Best Protect Indigenous Rights
in a Global REDD Regime, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 821, 840 (2011); ANNELIE FINCKE, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND REDD-PLUS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN REDD-PLUS, 2–3 (2010), available at
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/a4_iucn_indigenous_peoples_and_ redd_.pdf.
11. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 2.
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but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)—the foundational legal and
ethical principle under UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.12 As described in the
UNFCCC’s Art. 3(1):
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.13
CBDR would require that all nations mitigate GHG emissions and
contribute to adaptation efforts, but requires more significant contributions
from Northern nations (and, if we follow Harris’ view, all wealthy
citizens). The climate change conventions’ legal requirements combine
pragmatism with ethics. Pragmatically, some nations, predominantly in the
global North, have greater financial resources to mitigate GHG buildup and
help other nations adapt; those nations gained these resources from
industrial development whose excesses continue to pollute the global
atmospheric commons. Thus the North bears the primary responsibility to
reduce emissions and help the South adapt to the pollution the North has
emitted en route to economic prosperity.14
In carrying out their common but differentiated responsibilities, the
North should not exacerbate the injustices it purports to be mitigating.
Differences in wealth, power, environmental burdens, and environmental
benefits should narrow, not widen. While developed nations have enriched
themselves without paying for the pollution externalities of their
development, these nations are now beginning to support international
treaties and pass domestic laws that require curbing their GHG emissions
(while simultaneously fulfilling other domestic environmental goals.) The
rules chosen to mitigate GHG buildup and adapt to climate changes that
12. For an overview of CBDR, see Takacs, supra note 9, at 538–41 (2010); United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 106, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992)
(“[T]he global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic
conditions.”). See also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 10, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 (imposing obligations on the parties
based on CBDR); Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the
Climate Regime, 16 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 81, 93 (2005).
13. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 12, 1771 U.N.T.S. at
169.
14. See Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate
Change Regime–Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund,
18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 254–55 (2007); Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia KameriMbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector: Conceptual and Operational Fallacies,
10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 102–03 (1997); Rajamani, supra note 12, at 89, 93.
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cannot be prevented will be judged “fair” according to how those rules
distribute costs and benefits among the world’s citizens, and the processes
under which these rules are derived and implemented; what is “fair” is also
what is “deeply equitable.”15
Poor, rural citizens in developing nations seldom have power to
influence environmental decision-making in their own nations, let alone in
foreign nations.16 Often their land is their only asset—whether they own it,
or are in some type of usufruct arrangement for leasing the land and its
services, or are relying on traditional laws of community use, or simply are
dependent on forest products and free ecosystem services.17 They suffer
most when decisions about their land are made to maximize capital in
distant capitals. As Schlosberg expresses it, “Democratic and participatory
decision-making procedures are then both an element of, and a condition
for, social justice.”18 Suttles asserts that the EJ movement is a
“transformative, participatory social campaign” that “functions on a
democratic, nonhierarchical level that espouses a ‘bottom up’ approach
involving all members of the affected population. As such, it is a distinctly
empowering vehicle that galvanizes and catalyzes ordinary people to
advocate in their own self-interest.”19
I have written elsewhere about Environmental Democracy in REDD+
in developing nations:20 When making decisions about how vital
environmental resources will be used, local communities should be full
partners. Local citizens understand the land and resources, and depend on
these resources. Environmental democracy norms comprise the right to
participate in environmental decision-making; the right to access to
information on environmental decisions; the right to redress and remedy
when environmental rights are violated; and the right to Free Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) when governments formulate plans that will
15. RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE
11 (2004). For a thorough review of Environmental Democracy, see David Takacs, Environmental
Democracy and Forest Carbon (REDD+), 44 ENVTL. L. 71, 96 (2014).
16. Tseming Yang, International Environmental Protection: Human Rights and the North-South
Divide, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES AND APPLICATIONS 87, 90
(Kathryn M. Mutz, Gary C. Bryner, & Douglas S. Kenney eds., 2002); see Carmen Gonzalez,
Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The International Environmental Justice Implications of
Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 639 (2007).
17. Gonzalez, supra note 16, at 591; David Takacs, FOREST CARBON: LAW + PROPERTY RIGHTS
15 (2009).
18. David Schlosberg, Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political
Theories, 13 ENVTL. POL. 517, 519 (2004).
19. John T. Suttles Jr., Transmigration of Hazardous Industry: The Global Race to the Bottom,
Environmental Justice, and the Asbestos Industry, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 35–36 (2002).
20. See generally Takacs, supra note 15.
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affect vital resources and lands. When governments or developers of
environmental conservation and development programs fail to respect
environmental democracy norms, they may consign a project to failure, and
worse, violate the human rights and even destroy the lives of local
citizens.21
I and other scholars have analyzed the justice implications of climate
change: those who have done least to create the problem will suffer the
most.22 In this article I offer a twist: I examine what happens when
Northern GHG-reducing laws and policies (designed to avoid catastrophic,
global ecosystem change and the resulting environmental injustices that
will redound) paradoxically exacerbate injustice. To avoid this, we must
pay close attention to populations in distant lands that will be impacted if
our laws are implemented carelessly. Various authors have described
environmental injustices in international agreements where the North
carries disproportionate power in determining the results of negotiated
solutions to climate change and other environmental problems.23 Anand
notes that the “North is likely to use its position of privilege and power to
maximize the benefits it receives and minimize its costs, even at the
expense of justice or equity.”24 The examples I discuss herein pertain not
only to the terms of transnational legal instruments, but also to Northern
domestic laws purporting to ameliorate injustice, but instead sometimes
perpetuating it. These examples illustrate situations where nations, their
businesses, and their citizens, try to fulfill legal and ethical mandates at low
cost, with justice and equity possibly suffering as a result. Injustices are
perpetuated on poor people in rural areas in the South by citizens of the
North (and, in some cases, elites within their own nations), whose original
intentions may (sometimes) have been well-meaning, but who have not
considered the injustice offsets of their policies.
This paper starts with this observation: To compensate for a grave
environmental injustice–– climate change caused by industrial pollution—
Northern legal solutions should not exacerbate the problem. In this article, I
describe how EJ goals are undermined when domestic nations of the North
implement GHG-reducing laws, and I offer some solutions towards
ensuring that laws aimed to improve domestic environments and to

21. For a thorough review, see id.
22. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘First, Do No Harm’: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate
Change, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 593, 594 (2010); UN-REDD PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 8–10;
Baez, supra note 10, at 840; Fincke supra note 10, at 2–3; HARRIS, supra note 8, at 2.
23. David Hunter, Human Rights Implications for Climate Change Negotiations, 11 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 331, 358 (2009).
24. Anand, supra note 15, at 56.
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mitigate the externalities of Northern consumption actually contribute to a
more just world.
Drawing on the concept of “pollution havens”—places in the global
South that attract the worst industrial excess of the North’s production and
consumption—I introduce the concept of “mandate havens.” In a “mandate
haven,” a Northern body will pass a law mandating environmental
protection; its implementation, however, may have (perhaps unintended)
detrimental impacts in the South. Such mandates include international
agreements driven by Northern negotiators, national and subnational laws
implementing international commitments, or voluntary efforts of citizens
and businesses. How these initiatives are worded and implemented has
profound impacts in the South, in locations where communities have
played a scant role in creating climate change or in formulating the
solutions to the problems they have not created but whose effects they will
bear.
In particular, I explain how mandate havens result from laws requiring
biofuels production, and from laws that facilitate Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation, or “REDD+.” I appraise mandate
havens resulting from EU and US laws requiring increasing production of
plant-based fuels to replace traditional hydrocarbon-based biofuels, and
show how the developing world is proving an ever more conducive place to
grow the plants that provide the feedstock for biofuels. I display how
biofuels laws result in unjust mandate havens in the developing world, with
scant attention from the developed world for the impacts of their policies. I
then introduce REDD+, where investors pay people—usually in the global
South—to reforest degraded land or to refrain from cutting down trees; the
investor can sell the carbon thus stored in these trees on an international
market. I review how promoters of both biofuels plantations and REDD+
paint win-win-win scenarios that these schemes help climate, the local
environment, and impoverished rural people, and demonstrate that the
reality, however, may be quite different on the ground, as local
communities may lose access to land essential to their livelihoods. I present
potential solutions to unjust mandate havens: models are emerging for how
governments, businesses, and private citizens can work across national
boundaries to mitigate environmental injustice both through reducing
pollution back home while alleviating poverty and protecting local
ecosystems abroad. These EJ enhancing models can and should be
implemented for both biofuels and REDD+.
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POLLUTION HAVENS
Discussing international economic interdependence and justice, Beitz
describes “a pattern of relationships which are largely non-voluntary from
the point of view of the worse-off participants, and which produce benefits
for some while imposing burdens on others.” This inequality “has the
effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’
regimes.”25
To illustrate this concept in the environmental realm, various authors
have described “pollution havens.”26 Pollution—an externality created by
industrial society—may follow the path of least resistance to those least
able to refuse the burden. Developed nations regulate industrial activity to
minimize their own economic and environmental burdens for the benefits
of their own citizens who demand both salubrious environmental quality
and cheaper goods.27 When the costs of complying with these
environmental regulations are greater than the costs of relocating a business
or transporting its waste products, it makes business (albeit not justice)
sense to shift production or waste disposal to the developing world, where
standards (and enforcement of those standards) are weaker.28
Although some authors question the empirical evidence for pollution
havens,29 others cite clear evidence that businesses do, in fact, pollute
elsewhere when it becomes too expensive to comply with pollution
regulations back home.30 Developing nations may engage in a “race to the
bottom”: they deregulate to attract desperately needed economic
development, even if that development results in environmental
degradation.31 As Keeton expresses it, “the race to the bottom and its
resulting disparity will thus linger as an unfortunate byproduct of domestic
environmental regulation.”32
As developed nations tighten their pollution and other environmental
25. Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 360, 374–75
(1975).
26. Chelsea M. Keeton, Sharing Sustainability: Preventing International Environmental Injustice
in an Age of Regulation, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1167, 1171–73 (2012).
27. Antonius R. Hippolyte, Calls for National Intervention in the Toxic Waste Trade with Africa:
A Contemporary Issue in the Environmental Justice Debate, 58 LOY. L. REV. 301, 312 (2012); see
Kenda Jo M. McCrory, The International Exportation of Waste: The Battle of the Path of Least
Resistance, 9 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 339, 340 (1991).
28. See, e.g., Suttles, supra note 19, at 11–12.
29. See, e.g., Gunnar S. Eskeland & Ann E. Harrison, Moving to Greener Pastures?
Multinationals and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, 70 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2003).
30. Keeton, supra note 26, at 1169.
31. Id.; Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 302.
32. Keeton, supra note 26, at 1176.

DT edits Takacs Author Proof Nov 2014 (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2014]

AVOIDING MANDATE HAVENS

12/4/2014 7:12 PM

323

laws to protect the health and quality of life of their citizens, we close our
eyes to those who may suffer out of sight as a result of our own ever more
rigorous standards.33 For example, tightened regulation and torts suits over
asbestos in the developed world shifted asbestos manufacture to developing
nations, where “competitive deregulation” meant that “asbestos is life” for
desperately poor people who had no choice but to face the health risks
associated with its manufacture.34 Shipping e-waste and toxic waste to the
Global South for processing (estimates of 3 million tons of hazardous
waste from the North to other nations each year35), or relocating factory
production to developing nations with lax environmental and safety
standards that wouldn’t meet Northern regulatory laws create “havens” for
practices that would not meet Northern legal standards. We in the North
protect our quality of life by dumping on the already poor in the South,
widening inequality and fomenting environmental injustice.36
CLIMATE CHANGE MANDATE HAVENS
Under the Polluter Pays Principle, polluters should bear the cost of
cleaning up messes they have made.37 Yet the developed world has not
fully paid, and is not fully paying, for the pollution externalities we have
ignored en route to enriching ourselves. To fulfill the Polluter Pays
Principle, and to compensate for grave environmental justices caused by
our GHG pollution, our solutions should mitigate and not exacerbate
problems our pollution causes.
Yet, increasingly, land in the developing world is arrogated by what I
call “climate change mandate havens.” In their attempts to address GHG
pollution of the atmospheric commons caused by historical and continued
overconsumption of fossil fuels, nations of the global North have passed
laws designed to force citizens and industries to reduce GHG emissions
while weaning themselves from high-GHG emitting fossil fuels. Or,
citizens and businesses take it upon themselves to find ways to offset their
own GHG emissions. But even when intentioned to result in greater
environmental justice, methods of complying with these GHG reductions
may result in greater environmental injustice.
As Prof. Alice Kaswan writes, movements to promote both
“sustainability” and EJ seek to “guard against the risk of ‘tunnel vision’:
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 303; Keeton, supra note 26, at 1178.
See Suttles, supra note 19, at 28–29.
Hippolyte, supra note 27, at 308.
Keeton, supra note 26, at 1178; Suttles, supra note 19, at 35; Gonzalez, supra note 16, at 590.
West, supra note 5, at 153–56.
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one-dimensional environmental policymaking that fixates on a single goal
(like reductions in GHG emissions) without considering or addressing
broader implications.”38 Acknowledging the possibilities of injustice is the
first step towards justice. We are more likely to address international
environmental injustice if we explicitly address international EJ in our laws
or in standards that govern how our laws are to be implemented across
national borders.
When calculating actual GHG reductions from any climate change
legal prescription, entities increasingly must perform full cost, “life cycle”
accounting: We look at the GHGs emitted when raw materials are obtained
and transported, products are manufactured, land uses change indirectly to
accommodate GHG-saving land uses elsewhere, etc.39 Lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions are defined as the aggregate quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant
indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use changes),
related to the full fuel life cycle, including feedstock generation, extraction,
distribution and delivery, and use of finished fuel.40 In the U.S., to qualify
as “renewable,” under federal law, a fuel’s pathway must reduce lifecycle
GHG gas emissions by 20% compared to baseline lifecycle GHG
emissions—defined as the average lifecycle GHG emissions for gasoline or
diesel (whichever is being replaced by the renewable fuel) sold or
distributed as transportation fuel in 2005.41 When calculating GHG
emission reductions to comprise not just direct land clearance but indirect
land use changes (ILUCs), some studies suggest biofuels mandates may
increase GHG emissions.42
We should adopt this “life cycle” approach for social justice
safeguards, as well. That is to say, we should do a full cost, life cycle
international environmental justice accounting when designing,
implementing, and monitoring our climate change legal mandates.
One might hope that international law could address the injustices of
climate change mandate havens. But international law, as currently
formulated, is not sufficiently robust to address the problems of
international EJ discussed here. Proposed solutions to avoid transnational
pollution havens include trade barriers, extraterritorial regulation, and
38. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
149, 170 (2013).
39. See, e.g., PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD, GREENHOUSE
GAS PROTOCOL (2011), available at http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public /Product-Life-CycleAccounting-Reporting-Standard_041613.pdf.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2010).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1401 (2013).
42. See Gao, et al., supra note 3, at 23.
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international legal agreements.43 But all of these remain aspirational,
cumbersome, unpredictable, time consuming, and resource intensive.
International Human Rights Law requires nations to respect, protect, and
fulfill the human rights of their own citizens.44 But economically
challenged Southern nations hosting biofuels and REDD+ schemes have
incentives to accept the benefits of biofuels and REDD+, and lack the
power to counter the hegemonic international actors promoting these
ventures. Northern nations promoting biofuels and REDD+ have incentives
to allow their citizens and corporations to continue to profit from these
schemes, and often lack legal jurisdiction to remediate problems in distant
locales. International law simply has not worked to contain pollution
havens, and its mechanisms are unlikely to work soon or comprehensively
to address these problems.
Of course we should continue to develop and employ existing
international human rights law processes to address mandate havens. But I
would offer other, practicable options to fill in the dysfunctional gaps of
domestic laws in North and South and international law working across
borders.
Self-monitoring—whether it is individuals, businesses, or
nations—with external validation is a crucial step towards ensuring
international EJ in climate change mandate havens. When writing
domestic legislation in the North or when formulating standards for
business self-regulation of offsets, specific standards should include clear
criteria for how laws mandating biofuels or carbon offsets may or may not
operate. Mandates may incorporate NGOs as certifiers and verifiers of
compliance with national requirements, or require government inspectors to
ensure compliance.45
Furthermore, these standards, if widely implemented, can lead to
custom. I am not speaking of “customary international law,” where nations
consistently adhere to a norm, and act thusly because they believe they are
legally bound to do so—although that is a desirable goal. I am merely
saying that these standards may become industry custom, because they are
too expensive to circumvent, or to devise and implement alternate
standards, or it becomes morally unacceptable to devise and implement less
equitable standards.
If biofuels mandates require close attention to whose land the biofuels
are grown on, and to protecting the most vulnerable from (un)intended
ancillary impacts, it will make usurping land abroad for biofuels more
difficult or impossible. Justice-enhancing implementing standards will raise
43. Keeton, supra note 26, at 1195.
44. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 22, at 595.
45. Suttles, Jr., supra note 19, at 46.
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the cost of biofuels, and thus force consumers to consume less rather than
continue to consume an equal amount of fuel that has questionable
environmental benefits in the first place. If REDD+ projects and regional
schemes must attend both to MMRV requirements46 that ensure everyone is
doing what they say and to environmental democracy rights that guarantee
procedures for maximum participation from local communities who will be
most affected (for better or worse), REDD+ may become a scheme for
realization of genuine CBDR, whether it is nation to nation, state to state,
or citizen to citizen, where the wealthiest pay the full price of our “offsets.”
Or, REDD+ may become too expensive, in which case we may lose its
biodiversity benefits but also lose a pressure valve that allows us to
continue our profligate, GHG emitting habits. Full cost EJ accounting in
REDD+ may mean what we lose in prospective scale of REDD+ we may
make up in quality of projects that genuinely promote international EJ. For
both biofuels and REDD+, full cost, life cycle accounting for inequitable
social impacts must be included if we are to avoid creating environmentally
unjust climate change mandate havens.
BIOFUELS: CLEAN FUELS WITH DIRTY HANDS
WHY DO WE NEED TO ATTEND TO EJ WHEN IMPLEMENTING BIOFUEL
LAWS?
Various Northern governments—for example the EU, the US federal
government, and California—have adopted Renewable Fuel Standards
(RFS) that mandate that fuels must contain a certain percentage of plant
based feedstocks.47 Laws promoting the rush to biofuels emphasize
enhancing domestic energy security and reducing GHG emissions.
Corn and sugar cane are the primary biofuel feedstocks, although
sorghum, castor bean, sugar beet, sunflower, and, as mentioned earlier,
jatropha are also in production.48 “Second generation” biofuels, from the
“waste” parts like the leaves on a corn stalk, or from wood and agricultural
waste, remain a goal desired,49 but still not technologically feasible for

46. See generally David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 VT. L. REV. 653, 716 (2013).
47. Gao, supra note 3, at 2.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Roht-Arriaza points out that even second-generation biofuels can potentially have justice
implications. Economic benefits from “waste” products can provide the marginal benefit that tilts land
use towards large-scale monocultures. And so-called “waste” may sometimes be useful to local people.
For example, in a Clean Development Project in Thailand, rice husks viewed by project developers as
waste were components of traditional fertilizers. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 22, at 600.
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widespread use.50
Over 60% of US GHG emissions come from combusting fossil fuels.51
Just over half of this comes from producing electricity, and just under 30%
is generated by transportation.52 In the US, the RFS was first required as
part of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which mandated 7.5 billion gallons of
renewable fuel to be blended into gasoline by 2012.53 US law now requires
that fuel providers provide increasing volumes of both traditional (e.g.
ethanol from corn or sugar cane) and second-generation biofuels yearly
through 2022,54 with the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act
requiring 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022.55 Nearly all
gasoline sold in the US contains 10% ethanol; in Brazil, most vehicles can
use a 100% ethanol blend.56 Corn comprises nearly all ethanol used in
fuels in the US, and about 40% of the nation’s corn goes not into food, but
into ethanol.57 In the last decade, worldwide biofuel production has
increased five-fold.58 In the US between 2000–2012, ethanol production
increased by more than 700%.59
The stated policy rationales for the RFS are to improve US energy
security, to improve rural (US) economies, and to reduce GHG emissions.60
Furthermore, biofuels are promoted as burning cleaner, thus enhancing the

50. Id. at 4.
51. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last updated June 14, 2012).
52. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION’S ROLE IN REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS
ES-2 (2010), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/32000/32700/32779/DOT_
Climate_Change_Report_-_April_2010_- _Volume_1_and_2.pdf.
53. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 72 Fed. Reg.
23,900, 23,903 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
54. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard; 75 Fed. Reg.
14,670, 14,673 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) [hereinafter RFS2 Final
Rule/Renewable Fuel Standard 2”].
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2010). For a history of the RFS in US Law, see Timothy A.
Slating & Jay P. Kesan, The Renewable Fuel Standard 3.0?: Moving Forward with the Federal Biofuel
Mandate, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 374, 417 (2014).
56. Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 387–88.
57. World Fuel Ethanol Production, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://ethanolrfa.org/
pages/World-Fuel-Ethanol-Production (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).; Stephen Rattner, The Great Corn
Con, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/opinion/25Rattner.html.
58. NICOLE CONDON, HEATHER KLEMICK & ANN WOLVERTON, IMPACTS OF ETHANOL POLICY
ON CORN PRICES: A REVIEW AND META-ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVIDENCE 3 (2013) (presentation at
Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting,
Washington,
D.C.,
August
4–6,
2013),
available
at
http://ageconsearch
.umn.edu/bitstream/149940/2/Corn%20Ethanol%20and%20Food%20Prices%202013%20AAEA_subm
ission.pdf.
59. CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 5.
60. Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 398–99.
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quality of US air, as mandated by the 1990 Amendments to the US Clean
Air Act.61 Congress was attentive to ward off any adverse, unintended
consequences to the economy or ecology of the US62, and EPA has
clarified it can only grant a waiver if the RFS is to impact the economy of a
region, state, or our entire nation.63
Neither Congress nor EPA has attended to potential or realized
adverse consequences to economies or ecologies beyond the US borders.
Neither, for that matter, do many mainstream environmental critiques of
the RFS. These emphasize ancillary environmental impacts of the RFS—
especially failure to do life cycle accounting for GHGs, and failure to
account for indirect land use changes64—but pay scant attention to the out
of sight/out of mind environmental injustices of RFS domestic mandates.
Critics allege that biofuels mandates do little to reduce GHG
emissions, and may even emit more GHGs than conventional fuels.65 For
example, in Congressional Testimony, Scott Faber of the Environmental
Working Group cites studies that corn ethanol emits 28% more GHGs than
the equivalent amount of traditional gasoline.66 In Brazil, which decades
ago made a commitment to energy self-sufficiency through biofuels67,
sugar cane is cheaper and produces more GHG savings; however, few
locations in the US can grow sugar cane.68 Whatever its GHG reducing
potential, huge federal subsidies lead to a cost of $750/ton of CO2
reductions, which makes little economic sense, given other, cheaper means
of reducing CO2.69
Revisions of the US RFS now mandate a lifecycle analysis for GHG
emissions, giving a more accurate picture of true GHG savings.
61. See id. at 19.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A).
63. See, e.g., id.; Notice of Decision Regarding the State of Texas Request for a Waiver of a
Portion of the Renewable Fuel Standard, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,168, 47,172 (Aug. 13, 2008);
Notice of Decision Regarding Requests for a Waiver of the Renewable Fuel Standard, 77 Fed. Reg.
70,752 (Nov. 27, 2012).
64. See, e.g., THE UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE RENEWABLE FUELS
STANDARD, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (Aug 29, 2008), available at http://static.ewg.org
/reports/2008/rfs/0820RFfactsheet.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Rattner, supra note 57.
66. Only at the end of his testimony does Mr. Faber refer to food insecurity “around the globe.”
See Scott Faber, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce on Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard (July 24 2013), available at
http://www.ewg.org/testimony-official-correspondence/overview-renewable-fuel-standard-stakeholderperspectives.
67. Erik Bluemel, Biomass Energy: Ensuring Sustainability Through Conditioned Economic
Incentives, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2007).
68. See Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 383.
69. Rattner, supra note 57.
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Regulators’ calculations must include all emissions associated with
growing the crop, transporting the crop to production and fueling facilities,
converting the crop to ethanol, and indirect land use changes that might
result from biofuel production.70 Renewable fuels produced in facilities
that began construction after December 19, 2007 must reduce GHG
emissions at least 20% compared to baseline lifecycle GHG emissions.71
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate whether or not biofuels
meet the GHG reducing benefits its backers claim, or actually exacerbate
the problem.72 But it does seem likely that fulfilling the demands of EU and
US biofuels mandates is causing massive international environmental
injustice in distant lands to fulfill a (possibly) well-intentioned GHG
reduction mandate that will do little to reduce GHG emissions and may
even increase them while at the same time allowing Northern
overconsumption to continue unabated.
ACCOUNTING FOR INJUSTICE
As noted above, crops to supply biofuels mandates have to be grown
somewhere, and that somewhere is often in climate change mandate havens
in the global South. It is difficult to know how much acreage biofuels have
usurped: attempting to directly tie biofuels mandates to land clearing or
food insecurity in the global South is methodologically cumbersome.73
CIFOR estimates that 2.3% of global agricultural land is dedicated to
producing crops for biofuels; some estimates of up to 36% of land by 2030
will be required for biofuel production.74 Soybeans used to produce biofuel
in Mato Grosso, Brazil account for up to 5.9% of deforestation in the last
few years in addition to increasing tensions for who can control the land,
indigenous people working in Brazilian biofuel fields confront labor
abuses.75 Brazil is also attracting major corporate investors in oil palms to
produce biofuels.76 Oil palm for biofuels resulted in 2.8%–6.5% of
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(H) (2010).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
72. See Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse
Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238, 1238–40 (2008).
73. For why it’s difficult to link biofuels mandates to precise measurements of deforestation, see
Gao et al., supra note 3, at viii-ix, 2, 6-14, 26.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id. at ix, 27.
76. JAN WILLEM VAN GELDER & LAURA GERMAN, CIFOR, BIOFUEL FINANCE: GLOBAL TRENDS
IN BIOFUEL FINANCE IN FOREST-RICH COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE 3–4 (2011), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications
/pdf_files/infobrief/3340-infobrief.pdf.
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deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia.77 CIFOR also identifies
“emerging jatropha hotspots” that are likely to grow in future years, as the
Introduction to this paper suggests.78
Indirect land use changes (ILUCs) also occur: People need to eat, and
thus when biofuels occupy land currently used to produce food, farmers
must subsequently clear land elsewhere to grow displaced crops or graze
displaced cattle.79 Various studies suggest that these ILUCs dramatically
increase the ancillary GHG emissions caused by mandates meant to reduce
GHGs; these ILUCs will also drive the unjust social consequences of lost
food crops and local deforestation.80
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 16% of
citizens of developing countries—or about 850 million people—were
undernourished during the years 2007-2009.81 Condon et al. note that
“[f]uture food consumption trends in developing countries are particularly
dependent upon how much corn is diverted to non-food uses.82 The OECD
and FAO report that between 2007–2009, biofuels consumed 20% of sugar
cane, 9% of vegetable oil and coarse grains, and 4% of sugar beets grown.83
The US grows more than half of the world’s corn; although much of this
goes to feed animals that are slaughtered for food,84 increasingly animal or
human food crops shift to biofuel cultivation.
It is not clear how much biofuel mandates have led to increasing food
prices, and thus contributed to international environmental injustice.85 An
influential FAO report traces shifts in farming from food to fuel crops,
claiming this has increased the prices of food and exacerbated food scarcity
in developing countries; farmers in these countries must then either clear
more land to meet their food needs, or to meet the growing hunger for

77. Gao et al., supra note 3, at ix, 271.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. at 22; TIMO KAPHENGST, ET AL., ECOLOGICAL BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 20–21 (2012), available at http://www.ecologic.eu/files
/publications/1358406689/kaphengst_12_Ecologic_Brief_Biofuel.pdf; David M. Lapola et al., Indirect
Land-Use Change Can Overcome Carbon Savings from Biofuels in Brazil, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 3388, 3388 (2010).
80. Gao, et al., supra note 3, at 24.
81. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 48 (2001), available
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf.
82. See CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 2.
83. ACTIONAID, FUEL FOR THOUGHT: ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF EU BIOFUELS
POLICIES 5 (2012), available at http://www.actionaidusa.org/sites/files/actionaid/fuel_for_ thought.pdf.
84. Economic Research Service: Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade.aspx.
85. Slating & Kesan, supra note 55, at 447–448.
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biofuels to export.86 Ironically, such land clearing may result in overall net
increases in GHG emission by releasing the carbon stored in forests and
soils.87
A comprehensive 2013 meta-analysis concludes that each additional
billion gallons of ethanol production results in a 2–3% increase in corn
prices over the long run, but a higher 5-10% increase using shorter time
frames before markets and citizens adjust to changes in the law (and
resulting changes in food supply).88 The analysis reviews how other
studies connect biofuels mandates to food insecurity, and concludes that
whatever the parameters of the various studies, “biofuels expansion will
raise the number of people at risk of hunger or in poverty in developing
countries.”89 Other studies find that global grain prices will increase 16–
35% by 2020 due to EU biofuels mandates.90
Yet despite this evidence, neither the US nor the EU are paying
attention to the distant, unjust results of biofuels mandates, as I will explain
in the next section.
SOCIAL IMPACT BIOFUELS MONITORING – OR LACK THEREOF
Whatever the specific parameters of the unjust impacts turn out to be,
the EU and the US are paying inadequate attention to the EJ consequences
of their biofuels mandates. Scholars sometimes overlook this, as well. For
example, in their otherwise thorough analysis of federal biofuel mandates,
Timothy Slating and Jay Kesan review and comment on all proposed
reforms of US biofuels laws. Nothing in their review hints at any changes
that would consider the developing world EJ impacts of biofuel mandates.91
The US EPA requires “life cycle” analyses of biofuels, but only when
assessing GHG emissions and other environmental impacts. For example,
in one analysis of feedstock, the EPA states that “[o]ur analysis of land use
change GHG emissions includes an assessment of uncertainty that focuses
on two aspects of indirect land use change—the types of land converted
86. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY:
THE CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE & BIOENERGY, SOARING FOOD PRICES: FACTS, PERSPECTIVES,
IMPACTS,
AND
ACTIONS
REQUIRED
4,
8,
16–31
(2008),
available
at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/013/k2414e.pdf;
U.N.
ENV'T
PROGRAMME,
TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION & USE OF RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS 23, 63–64 (2009), available
at http://www.unep.org/pdf/biofuels/Assessing_Biofuels_Full_Report.pdf [hereinafter UNEP].
87. Id. at 67–68.
88. CONDON ET AL., supra note 58, at 2.
89. Id. at 31.
90. ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 15.
91. Slating & Kesan, supra note 55.
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and the GHG emissions associated with different types of land
converted.”92 While EJ impacts are mandated under this Symposium’s
celebrated Executive Order 12898 to address Environmental Justice in
Minority and Low-Income Populations in the US, the EPA’s life cycle
assessment simply concludes: “EPA has determined that this rule will not
have disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects on minority or low-income populations because it does not affect
the level of protection provided to human health or the environment.”93
The EPA does not examine justice impacts beyond US borders.
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) nods to EJ
considerations, but those considerations do not extend across national
borders.94 Regulators must look at “total potential costs and total potential
economic and noneconomic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse
gases to California’s economy, environment, and public health, using the
best available economic models, emission estimation techniques, and other
scientific methods.”95 Clearly that language does not consider anything
outside of California. Likewise, I find no mention of extraterritorial justice
considerations in any California statute implementing the RPS.96
The European Union has paid some attention to international
environmental justice issues—but not that much. The EU Renewable
Energy Directive, (or “RED”) and the Fuel Quality Directive mandate that
EU Member States create national policies promoting biofuels use. The
Renewable Energy Directive establishes a “20% target for the overall share
of energy from renewable sources and a 10% target for energy from
renewable sources in transport . . . .”97 The 20% target for renewable
sources distinguishes between member states based on previous capacity
for renewables, but each state must meet the 10% target for transport.98
The 10% transport target does not per se mandate biofuels use,99 allowing
the use of alternate energy savings by use of electric vehicles and other
means. However, much of the legislation focuses on biofuels as the main

92. Supplemental Determination for Renewable Fuels Produced Under the Final RFS2 Program
From Grain Sorghum, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,592, 74,605 (Dec. 17, 2012). This language is repeated verbatim
in other rulemakings.
93. Id. at 74,603.
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(f) (West 2014).
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(d) (West 2014).
96. See Cal. Exec. Order No. S-06-06; 2002 Cal. Stat. 1078 (introduced under Senate Bill 1078 in
2002 and expanded in 2011, 2011 Cal. Stat. 2).
97. 2002 Cal. Stat. 1078.
98. 2002 Cal. Stat. 1078.
99. Directive 2003/30/EC did mandate biofuel use, but was repealed by the RED. Council
Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16.
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driver of the 10% target.100
It is difficult to assess the land acreage that may have been cleared or
repurposed to fulfill EU (or other national) biofuels requirements. The 2011
Tirana conference of the International Land Coalition defined “land
grabbing” as land acquisitions that are in violation of human rights, without
prior consent of the preexisting land users, and with no consideration of the
social and environmental impacts.101 The NGO ActionAid estimates a total
at least 50 million hectares of biofuels land grabs.102 Another report
estimates that 13 to 19 million hectares will be required to fulfill EU
biofuels mandates by 2020.103 In a report on “[l]and grabs for biofuels
driven by EU biofuels policies,” Ecofys, a sustainable energy consulting
firm, offered a more sober assessment of 1.8 million hectares currently
“grabbed for biofuels,” of which 180,000 hectares derived from EU
biofuels mandates.104 Thus even the most conservative estimates point to
extensive diversion of land from crops and forests to biofuels cultivation.
In addition, the aviation industry is now embracing biofuels to avoid
price fluctuations from traditional fuels, to promote a greener image to
consumers, and to meet EU (and other) GHG reduction mandates.105 The
European Advanced Biofuel Flightpath joins the European Commission
with airlines including KLM and Lufthansa to make available 2.5 billion
liters of aviation biofuel by 2020; this is over and above that required by
the EU RED. Experts estimate this would require 3.5 million hectares of
land.106 To meet a stated 2050 target would take 13.6 million barrels of
biofuel each day which is nearly all the biofuels for all uses predicted to be
available at that time.107 The controversial EU Emissions Trading System
requires all airplanes flying in and out of EU airports to reduce their GHG
emissions; plant based aviation biofuels count as carbon neutral, thus

100. The savings must come from “all forms of transport.” See Council Directive 2009/28/EC art.
3, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16. (emphasis added).
101. Maria C. Rulli et al., Global Water and Land Grabbing, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 892,
892 (2013).
102. CARLO HAMELINCK, ECOFYS, LAND GRABS FOR BIOFUELS DRIVEN BY EU BIOFUELS
POLICIES 10 (2013), available at http://www.ecofys.com/files/files/ecofys-2013-report-on-landgrabbing-for-biofuels.pdf. See also ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 1.
103. UK RENEWABLE FUELS AGENCY, THE GALLAGHER REVIEW OF THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF
BIOFUELS PRODUCTION 32 (2008).
104. HAMELINCK, supra note 102, at iv.
105. See OAKLAND INSTITUTE, ECO-SKIES: THE GLOBAL RUSH FOR AVIATION BIOFUEL 16 (2013),
available at http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Report _Eco-Skies.pdf
[hereinafter Eco-Skies].
106. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUROPE, FLYING IN THE FACE OF FACTS: GREENWASHING THE
AVIATION INDUSTRY WITH BIOFUELS 9 (2011).
107. For an overview, see Eco-Skies, supra note 105, at 16.
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further incentivizing biofuels cultivation for aviation.108
Even at the low end of the estimates of acreage required to fulfill
biofuel mandates, acquiring land can have devastating effects on local
communities in the developing world, causing land dispossession, food
insecurity, water depletion and abusive labor practices.109 ActionAid
provides bleak case studies of ruined lives and broken promises in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Guatemala from plantations meant to export crops for
biofuels to the EU.110 For example, in Kenya, an Italian company seeking
to grow jatropha tried to lease 50,000 ha, potentially displacing 20,000
people, but the communities managed to oust the company.111 In
Guatemala, the national army evicted hundreds of families to make way for
a sugar plantation to fuel the EU biofuels market.112 In Tanzania, a British
company convinced communities to give up collective rights to land they
used to farm, graze livestock and harvest forest products. When the
subsequent corporate biofuels venture went bankrupt, the community was
left poorer and had lost their traditional land rights; security guards block
their access to their traditional lands.113
Some developing nations are implementing policies to govern biofuels
land grabs. For example, nine African nations have instituted specific
policies, and 14 others are developing policies.114 Implementing and
enforcing those policies may be difficult, given the many challenges facing
these nations, and given the comparative strength of transnational actors
driven by a strong profit motive. As I will discuss in the next section,
Northern nations must pay greater attention to EJ impacts when writing and
implementing biofuel laws.

108. Biofuels are Essential to Reducing EU ETS Carbon Costs and Meeting Carbon-Neutral
Growth Goals, Says Report, GREENAIRONLINE (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.greenaironline.
com/news.php?viewStory=1135.
109. Consolidated RSB EU Red Principles & Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production,
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels at 24, available at http://rsbservices.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/RSB-PC-V2.pdf. See also generally OXFAM INT’L, LAND AND POWER: THE
GROWING SCANDAL SURROUNDING THE NEW WAVE OF INVESTMENTS IN LAND (2011).
110. ACTIONAID, supra note 83, at 7–9.
111. See id. at 25.
112. See id. at 27.
113. OAKLAND INSTITUTE, TANZANIAN VILLAGERS PAY FOR SUN BIOFUELS INVESTMENT
DISASTER, LAND DEAL BRIEF 1 (2012).
114. HAMELINCK, supra note 102, at 11.
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CRITERIA FOR JUSTICE IN BIOFUELS MANDATE HAVENS
The EU calls for “sustainability” criteria when implementing biofuels
mandates, but has named little in the way of specific social or
environmental criteria. Member nations are encouraged, though not
required, to enter into agreements with non-EU nations regarding oversight
of the sustainability criteria.115 The EU’s official Directive expresses
concern over the growing need for agricultural commodities and warns
against “net increase in cropped area” for biofuels; but the concern is
expressed in the context of unaccounted for GHG increases, and does not
express similar concern for social dislocations.116 The Directive’s articles
pertaining to sustainability are primarily concerned with maintaining
ecological sustainability, but do refer in passing to a required biennial
report that includes, inter alia, “the impact of Community biofuel policy on
the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for people
living in developing countries, and wider development issues. Reports
shall address the respect of land-use rights. They shall state, both for third
countries and Member States that are a significant source of raw material
for biofuel consumed within the Community whether the country has
ratified and Implemented” a list of ILO Conventions, as well as the
Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety and Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species.117
The criteria do specify that biodiverse lands should not be converted
to growing biofuels crops:
The increasing worldwide demand for biofuels and bioliquids, and the
incentives for their use provided for in this Directive, should not have the
effect of encouraging the destruction of biodiverse lands. Those finite
resources, recognised in various international instruments to be of value to
all mankind, should be preserved. Consumers in the Community would, in
addition, find it morally unacceptable that their increased use of biofuels
and bioliquids could have the effect of destroying biodiverse lands. For
these reasons, it is necessary to provide sustainability criteria ensuring that
biofuels and bioliquids can qualify for the incentives only when it can be
guaranteed that they do not originate in biodiverse areas or, in the case of
areas designated for nature protection purposes or for the protection of rare,
threatened or endangered ecosystems or species, the relevant competent
authority demonstrates that the production of the raw material does not

115. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, art. 18, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16.
116. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 16.
117. Id.
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interfere with those purposes.118
It might be morally unacceptable to destroy biodiverse lands (a
sentiment with which I agree), but moral unacceptability does not yet
extend explicitly to the social implications of biofuels mandates. Even
here, the concern is for nonhuman lives, and not the humans that co-depend
upon the land.
The European Commission’s (EC) own required biennial 2012
progress report includes the social sustainability report required by article
17(7) of the RED, but devotes little analysis to this issue.119 The Report
estimates that 2.4 million hectares were used for feedstock crops outside
the EU to meet 2010 biofuels use. 60% of the feedstock for biofuels are
grown in the EU, with Argentina, Indonesia, Brazil, the US, and others
supplying the rest.120 Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and the US
were the top biodiesel providers.121
The progress report devotes a total of one paragraph to “social
sustainability,” concluding that “it is not yet clear if EU biofuels demand
contributes any abuse of land rights.” But noting that recent years have
seen global food prices increase, “Commission and Member States’
monitoring of this issue must, however, continue.”122 The EC notes that
while most countries producing the fuels have ratified labor and other
conventions noted in Article 17, enforcement is lax.123 The Commission
hints that “there are some gaps” in biofuel environmental sustainability
criteria, but notes that 13 “voluntary schemes” have been approved.124 The
section also notes that biofuels have created 1.4 million global jobs, but
provide no reference for this figure, and does not discuss what or who was
displaced when land was converted to biofuels cultivation.125 Member
States are required to report on fulfillment of the Directive, but few EU
member states have attended to the sustainability criteria, and the voluntary
schemes126 adopted by some member states have lax verification.127 For
118. Id.
119. RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRESS REPORT: REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
REGIONS
11
(2013),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0175:FIN:EN:PDF.
120. Id. at 15. Feedstock also came from Canada, Ukraine, Malaysia, Paraguay, Russia, China,
Switzerland, Peru, Egypt, Guatemala and “other.” Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 11–12.
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id. at 11–12.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Of these voluntary schemes, approved by the EU, few have social criteria, and do not include
the most popular ones. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 20–21.
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example, Germany says little about protections for non-EU land rights, and
in its report had no plan to enter into agreements with non-EU nations
regarding sustainability and social issues.128
The European Parliament is considering amending the biofuels
mandate to pay more attention to international EJ. One amendment under
consideration proposes that biofuels “shall not be made from land-based
raw material unless third parties’ legal rights regarding use and tenure of
the land are respected, inter alia by obtaining the free prior and informed
consent of the third parties, with the involvement of their representative
institutions.”129 Another Amendment proposes a biennial report “on the
impact on social sustainability in the Union and in third countries of
increased demand for biofuel on the contribution of biofuel production to
reducing the Union’s shortage of vegetable protein and on the impact of
Union biofuel policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in
particular for people [. . .] in developing countries, and [. . .] wider
development issues.”130 These requirements have not yet gone into effect;
it is not clear that they ever will.
As noted above, various companies have derived voluntary schemes
that would help a biofuels operator comply with EU-mandated social
sustainability criteria. A study by the World Wildlife Fund suggested that
most of the standards approved to certify “sustainability” under the EU
RED requirements were not truly sustainable. The “best-performing”
scheme was the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) standard.131
Indeed, RSB has the most aggressive social sustainability criteria of

127. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 17 (2013), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2013:0102:FIN:EN:PDF.
̈ ERNEUERBARE ENERGIE
128. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, NATIONALER AKTIONSPLAN FUR
GEMAß
̈ DER RICHTLINIE 2009/28/EG ZUR FOR
̈ DERUNG DER NUTZUNG VON ENERGIE AUS
ERNEUERBAREN QUELLEN [NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC ON THE PROMOTION OF THE USE OF ENERGY FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES] 63
(2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/ action_plan_en.htm.
129. Amendment 49 to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 98/70/EC (2013) COM (2012) 0595 (Sept. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20130357+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN Commission.
130. Amendment 50 to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive 98/70/EC (2013) COM (2012) 0595 (Sept. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20130357+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN Commission (italics and ellipses in the original).
131. Europe’s Biofuels Not Guaranteed Sustainable, Finds New Study, WWF (Nov. 28, 2013),
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/
renewable_energy/sustainable_energy_report/?212777/europes-biofuels-not-guaranteed-sustainablefinds-new-study.
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standards that Ecologic,a respected research institute, (and I) reviewed.
Several of the acceptable standards had no social sustainability criteria.132
Only RSB demands Free, Prior, and Informed Consent to “form the basis
for the process to be followed during all stakeholder consultation, which
shall be gender sensitive and result in consensus-driven negotiated
agreements.”133 Only the RSB standards forbid involuntary resettlement.134
RSB also offers the broadest protections for sustaining and enhancing food
security, and is the only standard requiring long-term commitments to the
community in which a biofuels enterprise operates.135
Nonetheless, at the time of a comprehensive examination of EU
sustainability schemes in 2012, only one enterprise had chosen RSB
(compared, e.g., to 934 that had chosen a single competitor that had much
less rigorous social criteria).136 This review warns of “the threat for a ‘race
to the bottom’ in social requirements,” as entities requiring certification
will seek the business with the lowest standards that nonetheless meet the
EU’s sustainability requirements.137 Paying attention to International EJ
when designing domestic policies may, however, price a mandate haven
out of the market.138
Some might argue that deleterious impacts in the South are simply
unintended international EJ consequences of an environmental mandate.
How unintended are these consequences, really? When legislators fail to
acknowledge the unjust impacts of their laws – even after years of data
support findings of injustice – at some point we must consider that
governments intend to perpetuate injustice. Certainly, for example, the US
would require some justice criteria, and the EU would require the strictest
of the standards that have been proposed (the RSB standard), or something
even stricter. Ideally, they would adopt an EU-wide standard that
delineates the standard, and any private verifiers would have to meet those
standards if a project or a national scheme were to be certified.
132. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 19–20.
133. ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS, ENERGY CENTER OF ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE, CONSOLIDATED RSB EU RED PRINCIPLES &CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE
BIOFUEL PRODUCTION
9 (2011), available at http://rsbservices.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/RSB-PC-V2.pdf. For a review of FPIC, see David Takacs, supra note 16.
134. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 21; ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS, supra
note 133, at 30.
135. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 21–22; ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE BIOFUELS,
supra note 133, at 9, 17.
136. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 20.
137. Id. at 24.
138. Takacs, supra note 46, at 721; Gloria Gonzalez, For REDD Proponents, No Regrets Despite
Policy, Finance Challenges, ECOSYSTEMS MARKETPLACE, http://www.ecosystem marketplace.com/
pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=10074&section=news_articles&eod=1 (Nov. 26, 2013).
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Despite protests to the contrary, it is difficult to envision how biofuel
cultivation in the developing world can ever promote sustainable
development and just lives. Some sources promote biofuels as a win-winwin for all stakeholders. Not only do Northern governments improve their
energy security and reduce GHG emissions, but promoters say biofuels
cultivation provides a source of jobs and/or income for Southern rural
citizens.139 Before it went bankrupt, Sun Biofuels, for example, promoted
its biofuels ventures that would “bring welfare to what are often
disadvantaged communities.”140
In a Report titled “Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield
Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?” the World Bank responds with a
cautious “yes.” While recognizing that biofuels pose risks to the developing
world, the World Bank nonetheless believes with careful attention, biofuels
actors can “minimize risks and capitalize on opportunities to contribute to
poverty reduction and economic growth, especially in rural areas.”141 The
World Bank and others have produced “Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and Resources.”
The seven principles for (as a group of activist organizations describe it,
“‘win-win’ land grabbing”:
1. Land and resource rights: Existing rights to land and natural
resources are recognised and respected.
2. Food security: Investments do not jeopardise food security, but
rather strengthen it.
3. Transparency, good governance and enabling environment:
Processes for accessing land and making associated investments are
transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability.
4. Consultation and participation: Those materially affected are
consulted and agreements from consultations are recorded and
enforced.
5. Economic viability and responsible agro-enterprise investing:
Projects are viable in every sense, respect the rule of law, reflect
industry best practice, and result in durable shared value.
6. Social sustainability: Investments generate desirable social and
distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability.
7. Environmental sustainability: Environmental impacts are quantified
and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while
139. See generally OAKLAND INSTITUTE, supra note 113, at 5.
140. Id. at 5 (Sun Biofuels website no longer active).
141. KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD
SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? xxvi (2011), available at http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/ESW_Sept7_final_final.pdf.
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minimising and mitigating the negative impact.142
If operationalized in rigorous, verifiable criteria, these principles
might be a good place to start. But should we start at all? A network of
international activists representing 130 groups has denounced these
principles, asserting that it is unjust to usurp any rural farmlands for food or
biofuels.143 The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food called these
principles “woefully inadequate;”144 The World Bank’s own researchers
could not find examples of win-win results for rural communities as a
result of land grabbing.145
It is conceivable that land grabbing in the South to fulfill Northern
biofuel mandates could result in lower GHG emissions – and thus
contribute to greater environmental justice through slowing climate
change’s onset and impacts. But unlike REDD+, whose operations may
sustain local functioning ecosystems and allow continued usufruct use of
forests, cultivating biofuels will inevitably replace farm lands or
functioning forests with industrial monocrops. Rural citizens may gain
employment, but it will likely be to the expense of their own ability to
gather and grow food, to their detriment. Biofuels mandates bring dubious
GHG reduction calculations that neglect ILUCs and transport costs,
coupled with the current and future appropriation of land and water
desperately needed by rural citizens of the global South, coupled with the
local pollution that corporate monoculture agriculture brings, as well as
alleged harsh labor conditions at energy crop plantations.146 No amount of
sustainability principles—even if rigorously verified on the ground (itself a
dubious proposition)—is going to prevent greater environmental injustices
stemming from continued ambitious Northern biofuel quotas that require
Southern land to fulfill.147
Unlike REDD+, whose operations may sustain local functioning
142. Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) that Respects Rights, Livelihoods
and
Resources:
Principle
7,
KNOWLEDGE
EXCHANGE
PLATFORM
FOR
RAI,
https://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/node/248 (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
143. Land Research Action Network, Stop Land Grabbing Now!! Say NO to the Principles on
Responsible Agro-Enterprise Investment Promoted by the World Bank, LANDACTION.ORG (Apr. 12,
2010), http://www.landaction.org/spip.php?article499.
144.
Olivier de Schutter, Responsibly Destroying the World’s Peasantry, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(June 4, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/deschutter1/English.
145. Via Campesina et al., It’s Time to Outlaw Land Grabbing, Not to Make it ‘Responsible’!,
GRAIN.ORG (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.grain.org/article/entries/4227-it-s-time-to-outlaw-landgrabbing-not-to-make-it-responsible.
146. KAPHENGST ET AL., supra note 79, at 7, 20–21.
147. UNESCO estimates that 2% of water used for irrigation is for energy crops. See THE UN
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3: WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD 10 (2008), available at
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR3_Facts_ and_Figures.pdf.
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ecosystems and allow continued usufruct use of forests, biofuels cultivation
usually replaces cultivated lands or functioning forests with industrial
monocrops. Rural citizens may gain employment, but it will likely be to
the expense of their own ability to gather and grow food, to their detriment.
Responding to negative publicity, private companies are taking action
to ameliorate injustice. For example, when nearly a quarter million people
took part in Oxfam’s campaign exhorting food and beverage companies to
respect land rights,148 Coca-Cola declared that “land grabbing is
unacceptable.” It commits to “third-party social, environmental and human
rights assessments” for the top countries from which its sugar cane is
supplied and making transparent from which companies and nations its
supply chain stems, making it easier for third parties to monitor
compliance. As part of its “zero tolerance for land grabbing,” Coca-Cola
pledges to adhere to the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, and
to commit to 100% sustainable sourcing of cane sugar by 2020.149
Under the label of the “Sustainable Aviation Fuel Users Group”
various airlines representing 32% of fuel demand pledged that “[j]et fuel
plant sources should be developed in a manner which is non-competitive
with food and where biodiversity impacts are minimized; in addition, the
cultivation of those plant sources should not jeopardize water supplies.”150
Furthermore, “development projects should include provisions for
outcomes that improve socioeconomic conditions for small-scale farmers
who rely on agriculture to feed them and their families, and that do not
require the involuntary displacement of local populations.”151 The group is
working with other organizations to develop standards and promote peerreviewed research on best practices.152
These kinds of commitments should not be merely voluntary; they
should be legally mandated, and incorporated into all Northern domestic
legislation promoting biofuels.
In the next section on REDD+, I will discuss how forest carbon offsets
148. The Coca-Cola Company Declares “Zero Tolerance” for Land Grabs in Supply Chain,
OXFAM CAMPAIGNS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pressroom/pressrelease/ 2013-1108/coca-cola-company-declares-zero-tolerance-land-grabs-supply-chain.
149. The Coca-Cola Company Commitment: Land Rights and Sugar, COCA-COLACOMPANY.COM,
http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/6b/65/7f0d386040fcb4872fa136
f05c5c/proposal-to-oxfam-onland-tenure-and-sugar.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
150. Back
to
Initiatives
&
Projects
List,
INT’L
CIVIL
AVIATION
ORG.,
http://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/GFAAF/Pages/Project.aspx?ProjectID=13 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2014).
151. Susanne Retka Schill, Aviation Group Forms to Support Sustainable Biofuels, BIOMASS
MAG., http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/2077/aviation-group-forms-to-support-sustainable-biofuels.
152. Our Commitment to Sustainable Options, SUSTAINABLE AVIATION FUEL USERS GRP.,
http://www.safug.org/safug-pledge/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
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may, if done with rigorous attention to rigorous standards, lead to a more
environmentally just world. Those social sustainability criteria begin with
the recognition that actions taken to reduce Northern GHG footprints must
take into account the social impacts of those actions in places otherwise out
of sight and mind.
REDD+: CLIMATE CHANGE MANDATE HAVENS
THAT CAN ACTUALLY MAKE FOR A MORE
ENVIRONMENTALLY JUST WORLD – OR NOT
Programs in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation—or REDD+ —present another example of potential climate
change mandate havens. REDD+ programs have attracted over $5 billion
dollars in pledged or spent funds from the United Nations, international
financial institutions, companies looking for GHG offsets, national and
subnational governments, environmental and social welfare NGOs, and
private citizens.153 In a REDD+ project or program, an individual
landowner, local community, private developer, or government entity
reforests degraded land or pledges to preserve a forest that would otherwise
be felled.154 They may then sell the sequestered carbon for a contracted
period of time to entities that want to offset their GHG emissions (either
because they are legally mandated to do so or they are voluntarily reducing
their climate change footprint) or simply wants to fund forest
preservation.155 REDD+ happens on a project-by-project basis, where a
developer contracts with landowners to preserve or reforest land, and sells
the stored carbon. Alternatively, nations, states, or provinces implement
REDD+ on a broader, “jurisdictional” scale, i.e., they use REDD+ funds to
reduce deforestation or promote reforestation in a broad geographic area,
resulting in greater stored carbon than would have occurred absent the
153. See MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., FOREST TRENDS INITIATIVE, COVERING NEW GROUND:
STATE OF THE FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2013 vii (2013), available at http://www.foresttrends.org/documents/files/SOFCM-full-report.pdf; see also ANNA CREED, THE PRINCE’S RAINFORESTS
PROJECT, EMERGENCY FINANCE FOR TROPICAL FORESTS: TWO YEARS ON: IS INTERIM REDD+
FINANCE BEING DELIVERED AS NEEDED? 7–10 (2011), available at http://www.pcfisu.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/Two-years-on_Is-interim-REDD+-Finance-being-delivered-as-needed.pdf.
154. Lisa Hayden, So What is REDD, Anyway?, PLANET CHANGE (Dec. 8,2010),
http://change.nature.org/2010/12/08/so-what-is-redd-anyway/. Also falling under REDD+’s aegis:
programs to improve forest management, improve agriculture to retain soil carbon, and preserve
peatlands.
About
REDD+,
UN-REDD
PROGRAMME,
http://www.unredd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/102614/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). See generally CREED,
supra note 153; PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., supra note 153.
155. See David J. Kelly, The Case for Social Safeguards in a Post-2012 Agreement on REDD, 6 L.
ENV’T & DEV. J. 61, 67 (2010); see also TAKACS, supra note 17, at 10.
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funding.156
Terrestrial plants absorb about a quarter of the CO2 that humans emit;
deforestation accounts for somewhere between 15-32% of GHG
emissions.157 REDD+ mitigates climate change when trees retain carbon
that deforestation or forest degradation would otherwise release.
Furthermore, preserving forests helps preserve the planet’s dwindling
supply of fully functioning ecosystems that support a trove of
biodiversity.158
REDD+ may greatly contribute to a deeply equitable world; it offers a
chance to institute legal reforms that preserve the planet’s biodiversity,
mitigate the planet’s human poverty, and innovate the way developed and
developing nations incentivize sound methods of sustainable living for a
sustainable planet. Intact forests help rural communities adapt to climate
change by sustaining ecosystem services that purify water, increase rainfall,
prevent erosion, buffer floods, and harbor crop pollinators.159 REDD+ may

156. For an overview of California’s possible REDD+ offsets program, reference REDD OFFSET
WORKING GROUP, CALIFORNIA, ACRE AND CHIAPAS: PARTNERING TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM
TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION
(Evan
Johnson
ed.,
2013),
available
at
http://greentechleadership.org/documents/2013/07/row-final-recommendations-2.pdf;
IPAM
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OVERVIEW OF SUBNATIONAL
PROGRAMS TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) AS
PART OF THE GOVERNORS’ CLIMATE AND FOREST TASK FORCE 1-1–1-5 (2012), available at
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/EPRI.pdf; SAUNDERS ET AL.; PROFOREST, REDUCED
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION: LESSONS FROM A FOREST
GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 4 (2008).
157. REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP supra note 156, at 10; CGIAR RESEARCH PROGRAM ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, BIG FACTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, available at http://ccafs.cgiar.org/bigfacts/global-agricultureemissions; Valerie Volcovici, A Slow Start for the Carbon Credit Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/business/energy-environment/a-slow-start-for-the-for-carboncredit-market.html?pagewanted=all; KEVIN WATKINS, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED
WORLD
2007
1,
40–41
(2007),
available
at
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/
reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf (noting that deforestation accounts for between 11 and 28
percent of total carbon dioxide emissions); American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. Res. 2454,
111th Cong. § 752(2) (2009); Gleb Raygorodetsky, Can REDD Ever Become Green, OUR WORLD
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/can-redd-ever-become-green/; Robert J. Carpenter,
Implementation of Biological Sequestration Offsets in a Carbon Reduction Policy: Answers to Key
Questions for a Successful Domestic Offset Program, 31 ENERGY L.J. 157, 158 (2010).
158. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011,
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 14-15 (Mar. 15, 2011).
159. VALERIE CAPOS ET AL., U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION: A KEY OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS 9–10 (2007); Stefano
Pagiola et al., Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and Development in SELLING
FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds., 2002); David Freestone, Foreword to CLIMATE CHANGE
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also provide new sources of income and stability through direct payments
for preserving forests, and by teaching new forestry-related skills,160 or by
providing for more secure, formal land title.161 REDD+ may promote
greater institutional adaptation through enhanced democratic participation
as community leaders, landowners, and local government officials develop
and manage REDD+ projects and hone skills and institutions to negotiate
effectively with project developers and government functionaries.162
However, REDD+, if done poorly—i.e. if project managers do not
focus on EJ—may exacerbate environmental injustice. I have criticized
REDD+, analyzing the injustices wrought by early projects, enumerating
equitable principles for REDD+ that are difficult to achieve, and describing

AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES ix, xii (Charlotte Streck et al. eds.,
2008); THE CERSPA INITIATIVE, CERTIFIED EMISSIONS REDUCTION SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (2009), available at http://www.cerspa.com.
160. See Richard Tipper, Helping Indigenous Farmers to Participate in the International Market
for Carbon Services: The Case of Scolel Té, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKETBASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 223, 232 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds.,
2002); Margaret Skutsch et al., Alternative Models for Carbon Payments to Communities under
REDD+: A Comparison Using the Polis Model of Actor Inducements, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 140,
143 (2011); Promode Kant, REDD Should Create Jobs, Not Merely Bring Compensation 3 (Inst. of
Green Econ., Working Paper No. 13, 2010), available at http://www.igrec.in/REDD_
should_create_Jobs_Not_merely_bring_compensation.pdf; International Workshop in Mexico Explores
the Role of Local Communities in REDD+ MRV, FOREST CARBON P’SHIP FACILITY,
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/international-workshop-mexico-explores-role-localcommunities-redd-mrv (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
161. See TAKACS, supra note 17, at 53–57; Ashwini Chhatre et al., Social Safeguards and CoBenefits in REDD+: A Review of the Adjacent Possible, 4 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL.
SUSTAINABILITY 654, 655 (2012) (suggesting that increased land security for local communities,
combined with effective participation in land management, can prevent adverse social impacts of
REDD+ and better achieve environmental and climate objectives); see KATOOMBA GROUP ET AL.,
PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED 10 (2008), available at
http://www.katoombagroup.org/documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf; WILLIAM D. SUNDERLIN ET
AL., RIGHTS & RES. INITIATIVE, FROM EXCLUSION TO OWNERSHIP? CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN ADVANCING FOREST TENURE REFORM 29–30 (2008) (noting that community based land ownership
can prevent land appropriation by outside developers); Carina Bracer et al., Organization and
Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmental Services 35–36 (World
Agroforestry Ctr., Working Paper No. 39, 2007), available at http://www.worldagroforestry
.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/wp14961.pdf; Julian Quan & Nat Dyer, Climate Change and Land
Tenure: The Implications of Climate Change for Land Tenure and Land Policy 52 (Int’l Inst. for Env’t
& Dev. and Natural Res. Inst., Univ. of Greenwich, Land Tenure Working Paper No. 2, 2008),
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/aj332e/aj332e00.pdf.
162. Chhatre et al., supra note 161, at 657; Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean
Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 DENV.
J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 615, 623 (2004) (discussing how sustainable development is considered by
Africans to necessitate institutionalization of balanced growth practices); Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah,
CDM Participation and Credit Pricing in Africa, in EQUAL EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE
FOR CARBON 127, 133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel eds., 2007), available at
http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/Perspectives/FairPriceCarbon.pdf.
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the formidable set of legal issues for allocating forest carbon as property.163
REDD+ may fail to mitigate global climate change, and instead may
violate human rights, undercut democracy, and may create a pressure valve
that permits developed citizens’ unjust, GHG-polluting habits to go
unabated, allowing the already rich (mostly in the global North) to assuage
their consciences and actually profit at the expense of the poor (in the
global South) they are allegedly aiding.164 At the same time, REDD+ may
exacerbate inequities as it exacts high opportunity costs: local people and
national governments may be barred from using forests to generate profits
(e.g. through logging) or to sustain local communities (e.g. through
conversion to agricultural land or harvesting trees for building material).165
Yes, REDD+ can be criticized on multiple levels, not least of which it
is a neoliberal response to an ethical/equity problem, and not least is that it
is a top down set of laws and policies promulgated in the global North,
based upon Northern laws and notions of contract and property.
Nonetheless, it does have important lessons to teach us – both cautionary
tales, and ways forward to how to account for EJ issues that intentionally or
unintentionally arise from domestic responses to environmental
degradation. But developing nations are not suddenly going to set the
procedural or substantive terms of the agenda, and the North isn’t going to
suddenly own up to its culpability for polluting the global atmospheric
commons and stop polluting and/or pay reparations for its depredations.166
Given that we have invested and continue to invest billions of dollars in
REDD+, we can tilt at windmills or we can engage with what is really
happening in the world.
And, as noted above, REDD+ is happening. Because of its potentially
enormous synergistic benefits, REDD+ has numerous, diverse
supporters.167 REDD+’s success depends on how effectively it is

163. See David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation,
and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 84–87 (2009); David Takacs,
supra note 9, at 523 (2010); TAKACS, supra note 17, at 5, 7.
164. DURBAN GRP. FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE, NO REDD! NO REDD PLUS!: GLOBAL SIGN-ON
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SCHEMES FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST
DEGRADATION (2010), available at http://www.durbanclimatejustice.org/wp-content/uploads
/2010/04/durbanREDDstatement_en.pdf; Jesse Ribot & Anne M. Larson, Reducing REDD Risks, 6
INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 233, 233–35 (2012).
165. Chhatre et al., supra note 161, at 657; REDD-NET, MARKET AND NON-MARKET COSTS OF
REDD+ PERCEIVED BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY IN EAST CAMBODIA 3 (2011), available
at http://redd-net.org/files/case%20study%205%20-%20cambodia%20Alice %20final.pdf.
166. For a review of the paradigm differences in how North and South view aid, see Takacs, supra
note 46, at 719–27.
167. Peter J. Kanowski et al., Implementing REDD+: Lessons from Analysis of Forest
Governance, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 111, 112 (2011); Takacs, supra note 163, at 60–61; James
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incorporated into future UNFCCC agreements, and on whether Northern
jurisdictions begin to accept REDD+ offsets to fulfill compliance
requirements. But whether REDD+ goes boom or bust is not the relevant
point for this paper – the point is the way decision makers, often in the
private sector or NGO sector, are attempting to mainline EJ principles into
the required criteria for certification. Of course, it may also be that
adhering to these principles may itself be contributing to REDD+’s
uncertain future: The care stakeholders must invest to attend to EJ will
make REDD+ more expensive. But if it is too expensive to incorporate
justice into offsets, perhaps that means no regulatory race to the bottom,
and nations and industrial entities will have to clean up their own messes.
On the other hand, REDD+’s failure would also means a failure to transfer
billions of dollars from North to South while at the same time losing crucial
opportunities to preserve the ecological matrix required by local
communities in the global South, even more crucial as a resilience strategy
for coming climate change.
In my experience, both opponents and proponents of REDD+ may be
right; it all depends upon how REDD+ is implemented. Above all, if
REDD+ is to contribute to greater international EJ – and not exacerbate
existing inequities – its stakeholders must pay explicit attention to justice,
and must develop tight standards with firm validation and verification that
these standards are being met.168
EJ advocates have objected to perceived climate change mandate
havens in principle, and in court. EJ advocates challenged California’s
AB32 on EJ grounds, alleging that the Scoping Plan to implement AB32
fails to achieve the maximum GHG reductions possible, particularly due to
methodological difficulties of the proposed cap and trade system. This
challenge ultimately failed.169 Separately, a coalition of 27 EJ and
biodiversity-advocating NGOs signed a letter to Governor Brown arguing
that allowing REDD+ to count as compliance-grade offsets is unlikely to
help forests, due to methodological concerns.170 Furthermore, they allege,
such allowances will only exacerbate EJ concerns in CA, as it allows

Kanter, In London's Financial World, Carbon Trading is the New Big Thing, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/business/worldbusiness/06carbon.html; Valerie Volcovici,
supra note 157.
168. See Takacs, supra note 46, at 717.
169. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65(Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
170. Letter from Greenpeace et al., to Jerry Brown, Governor of California (May 3, 2013),
available at http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/06/greenpeace-friends-of-the-earth-us-sierra-clubcalifornia-and-24-other-environmental-organisations-oppose-redd-offsets-in-californias-cap-and-tradescheme/.
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continued industrial emissions within state borders.171
On the other hand, the REDD Offsets Working Group (ROW) has
been working with the State to implement “jurisdictional” REDD+, i.e.
devising comprehensive plans to reduce deforestation on a state or province
level; their pilot projects are based on a Memorandum of Understanding
between California, Chiapas (Mexico) and Acre (Brazil).
This
“jurisdictional” approach, they argue, allows for more comprehensive,
human rights respecting, synergistic, methodologically robust means of
implementing REDD+.172 For example, jurisdictional REDD+ “seek largescale changes in the rural development model that intensify agricultural
yields, re-direct agricultural expansion away from forests and onto lands
that have already been cleared, improve the livelihoods of indigenous
people and other economically-marginalized rural communities, strengthen
and expand networks of forest protected areas, and improve the
conservation of soils, water resources, and biodiversity.173
How to ensure that justice-respecting REDD+ actually delivers on its
promise? The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)
presents the most robust standards that ensure REDD+ will safeguard local
communities. A partnership of five NGOs with support from various
business interests, the standards aim to “stimulate and promote land
management activities that credibly mitigate global climate change,
improve the wellbeing and reduce the poverty of local communities, and
conserve biodiversity.”174 The CCBA has a set of standards (updated in
December 2013) for project developers to use, and over 130 projects have
used the standards.175 With even greater potential to improve EJ in
REDD+, The CCBA has put out “Social & Environmental Standards” to be
used on a jurisdictional level: That is to say, rather than assess REDD+ on a
project-by-project basis, a state or province or nation uses REDD+ funding
to promote reforestation or reduce deforestation resulting in stored CO2
above a “business as usual” (BAU) baseline.176 Ecuador, Nepal, the

171. Id.
172. REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, supra note 156, at 10–14.
173. Id. at 11.
174. CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, CARE, RAINFOREST ALLIANCE, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, CCB STANDARDS 1 (3d. ed. 2013), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/Third_Edition/CCB_Standards_Third_Edition _December_2013.pdf
[hereinafter CCB Standards].
175. Id. at 3.
176. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., OVERVIEW OF SUBNATIONAL PROGRAMS TO REDUCE
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD) AS PART OF THE GOVERNORS'
CLIMATE AND FOREST TASK FORCE, 1–5 (2012), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/
documents/EPRI.pdf.
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Brazilian state of Acre and the Indonesian province of Kalimantan have
adopted the standards to govern REDD+.177
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) has named a set of REDD+ safeguards,178 but these remain
broad, non-binding, framework principles. In the absence of a set of
functional safeguards (i.e. with enough specificity that all stakeholders can
implement them), the CCBA standards are our best model for how to
implement REDD+ to achieve greater justice. Many EJ principles are
incorporated into these voluntary standards project developers use as they
seek certification to conduct REDD+ and sell the resulting carbon
credits.179 While these standards remain voluntary, at some point state of
the art soft law standards will become hard law when these standards
become entrenched, or too ethically respected to contravene.180
It is not that voluntary standards are a guaranteed key to unlock
international EJ benefits. They don’t automatically overcome nations’
legal responsibilities to legislate and enforce domestic and international
human rights laws.181 It is not clear who enforces the standards should
project actors not fulfill their contracted responsibilities.182 Because these
projects are usually carried out and validated by private business interests,
one is right to question whether they will prioritize justice when profits are
at stake.183 Private businesses contract to verify results may be “captured”
by their clients, and may be loathe to raise concerns for fear others will not
hire them.184 Carbon businesses may accept such voluntary regulation in
order to advertise their corporate social responsibility to consumers, and/or
to show that industry can regulate itself, thus obviating the need for more
formal legal strictures.185 Methodological difficulties still abound: For

177. Country Overview, REDD STANDARDS, http://www.redd-standards.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=16&Itemid=19 (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
178. UNFCCC COP-16 para 72 and app I, para 2. Note the “should” language where “shall”
should be if the safeguards were to be binding. CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 174, at 1.
179. Eduard Merger et al., Options for REDD+ Voluntary Certification to Ensure Net GHG
Benefits, Poverty Alleviation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Biodiversity Conservation, 2
FORESTS 550, 551–54, tbl. 1 (2011), available at http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/2/2/550.
180. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 543 (2009).
181. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 498, 524 (Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
182. Id. at 526.
183. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (2007).
184. Takacs, supra note 163, at 75–77 (2009).
185. Morrison, supra note 181, at 504; Muchlinski, supra note 183, at 567.
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example how to choose a baseline of predicted deforestation against which
you measure the actual deforestation that occurs. And accurate, fair
verification of results may still be problematic. But as I examine the
criteria in these standards, it strikes me that jurisdictions and project
proponents that actually adhered to these standards would fulfill the justice
promises of REDD+.
The standards provide excellent principles, which, if realized, would
contribute to deeply equitable, justice-serving REDD+. They name not
only the principle objectives, but the criteria for delivering the principles,
and indicators that provide the information that must be provided to
demonstrate compliance with any principle.186 In their rigor and specificity
– not only on social justice safeguards, but on climate and biodiversity
benefits—the CCBA standards lend an imprimatur of legitimacy to
investors, and result, on average, in higher premiums for carbon credits
from projects using the standards.187
For those looking for a set of standards, which, if realized, would
maximize EJ in REDD+, I would point to these justice-serving,
overarching principles (all direct quotes):
The REDD+ program recognizes and respects rights to lands,
territories, and resources;
The benefits of the REDD+ program are shared equitably among
all relevant rights holders and stakeholders;
The REDD+ program improves long-term livelihood security and
well-being of Indigenous Peoples and local communities with special
attention to women and the most marginalized and/or vulnerable people;
The REDD+ program contributes to good governance, to broader
sustainable development and to social justice;
All relevant rights holders and stakeholders participate fully and
effectively in the REDD+ program;
The REDD+ program complies with applicable local and national
laws and international treaties, conventions and other instruments.188

The standards seek to minimize environmental burdens and maximize
environmental benefits. The standards pay close attention to equitable
benefit sharing, and require a transparent process of revealing and
186. REDD+ SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 5 (2012), available at http://www.reddstandards.org/files/REDDSES_Version_2/REDDSES_Version_2_-_10_September_2012.pdf
[hereinafter REDD STANDARDS].
187. CCB Standards, supra note 174; THE CLIMATE, COMMUNITY, AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/CCBA/CCB_Standards_FactSheet.pdf, citing PETERS-STANLEY ET AL.,
supra note 153, at 32.
188. REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 8, 11–13, 18, 22.
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allocating potential benefits, costs and risks.189 REDD+ must improve
“long-term livelihood security and well-being of indigenous Peoples and
local communities with special attention to women and the most
marginalized and/or vulnerable people.”190 The revised standards especially
hope to support REDD+ benefits for “smallholder and community ledprojects,”191 which have face barriers in accessing REDD+ funds, often due
to lack of institutional capacity needed to fulfill REDD+’s complicated
guidelines. The standards authors note “the serious risks notably for
Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and in particular for
marginalized and/or vulnerable social groups within those communities”
and aims to allay those risks and provide benefits for all stakeholders.192
The promoters of these standards see these as a fundamental building
block to help states form their own, durable REDD+ social safeguards193
To my eyes, they provide an excellent model for any jurisdiction looking to
maximize justice when implementing REDD+.
Furthermore, the standards were derived in an open, participatory
manner with extensive input from an array of stakeholders,194 and include
ancillary additional guidance about how to work with multi-stakeholder
groups involved with decision-making around social and environmental
standards for REDD+.195 And the standards epitomize current, best
practices in Environmental Democracy;196 they require that “all relevant
rights holders and stakeholders participate fully and effectively in the
REDD+ program,” that builds upon local knowledge and requires
“culturally appropriate, gender sensitive and effective participation.”197
Furthermore, the standards demand a participatory property mapping
process inclusive of women and marginalized and/or vulnerable people;
transparent, gender-sensitive, free, prior, and informed consent of
Indigenous peoples and any affected local communities, including for
permission to us traditional Indigenous knowledge, innovations and

189. Id. at 11–12.
190. Id. at 12.
191. CCB Standards, supra note 174, at 4.
192. REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 3.
193. Id. at 4.
194. History of the REDD+ SES Initiative, REDD STANDARDS,
standards.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=12 (last
2014).
195. Information on Multi-Stakeholder Process, REDD STANDARDS,
standards.org/files/Multistakeholder_-Information-Note-REDD-SES-ENG.pdf (last
2014).
196. For a review, see Takacs, supra note 16.
197. REDD STANDARDS, supra note 186, at 18–19.

http://www.reddvisited Feb. 24,
http://www.reddvisited Feb. 24,
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practices; transparent governance and grievance procedures; and capacity
building so that all affected stakeholders are able to participate
effectively.198
In the absence of an agreed upon international framework for
maximizing international EJ when implementing REDD+, these voluntary
standards set the standard. They would certainly provide a fine framework
for future UNFCCC, World Bank, or other large-scale implementers or
REDD+.
Furthermore, these standards comprise a fine launchpad for those
looking to avoid large scale environmental injustices when biofuels
requirements lead to unjust climate change mandate havens. It might be
that biofuels proponents would be unable to employ these standards
successfully. That would not be because the standards are not apt for
biofuels– they would adapt quite well to that context. Instead, Northern
lawmakers and biofuels business developers might find that they cannot
implement biofuels plantations and avoid environmental injustice at the
same time.
CONCLUSION
Many nations of the world seek to improve national and international
environmental quality, and implement laws to effectuate this goal.
Sometimes those laws are implemented with an express intent to ameliorate
environmental injustices. This is particularly true for laws meant to reduce
GHG emissions and thus mitigate the worst incipient impacts of climate
change, which will disproportionately harm world’s poorest citizens.
Those laws aiming to slow the onset of climate change should not end
up exacerbating the injustices they purport to assuage. Laws promoting
biofuel use and programs meant to promote REDD+ may not pay sufficient
attention to the justice impacts they impose, and may worsen the condition
of already poor citizens in the global South. Just as strict domestic
environmental laws in the North may lead to pollution havens in the South,
so may Northern GHG reducing laws lead to unjust climate change
mandate havens.
US and EU regulations mandating ever increasing percentages of
biofuels seem clearly to be causing environmental injustices in the
Southern nations growing feedstock to meet these mandates. Northern
governments and their citizens are paying insufficient attention to these
injustices.
Some voluntary standards are emerging, but they pay
198. Id. at 8–9, 13, 19–21.
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insufficient attention to EJ impacts, and are slow to be adopted. The US
has scarcely considered biofuels justice impacts beyond its borders.
REDD+ is making greater progress towards streamlining EJ principles
into its implementation. While both biofuels and REDD+ advocates stress
the promotion of justice for Southern nations helping to fulfill the
mandates, widespread cultivation of biofuels feedstock is going to result in
land grabs and difficult labor. On the other hand, REDD+ has vast potential
to preserve the ecological matrix essential for rural communities to survive
and thrive while potentially transferring billions of dollars of wealth from
North to South. While the social and environmental standards discussed
here are not panaceas, they do pose an excellent model for mandate havens
to become centers of greater EJ in the world.
We should clean up the messes we have made without making bigger
messes for those in distant nations, out of sight and out of mind. Strict
environmental justice criteria should be developed and implemented to
avoid creating unjust mandate havens. Those criteria should be deeply
equitable, i.e. they should result in laws and policies that act in synergy to
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and
ecosystems.

